

209079


JPRS 83650

10 June 1983

Japan Report

No. 173

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED



19980706 164

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

4
37
A03

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS REPORTS

Japan Report
Korean Affairs Report
Southeast Asia Report
Mongolia Report

Near East/South Asia Report
Sub-Saharan Africa Report
West Europe Report
West Europe Report: Science and Technology
Latin America Report

USSR

Political and Sociological Affairs
Problems of the Far East
Science and Technology Policy
Sociological Studies
Translations from KOMMUNIST
USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology
World Economy and International Relations
Agriculture
Construction and Related Industries
Consumer Goods and Domestic Trade
Economic Affairs
Energy
Human Resources
International Economic Relations
Transportation

Physics and Mathematics
Space
Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine
Military Affairs
Chemistry
Cybernetics, Computers and Automation Technology
Earth Sciences
Electronics and Electrical Engineering
Engineering and Equipment
Machine Tools and Metal-Working Equipment
Life Sciences: Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences
Life Sciences: Effects of Nonionizing Electromagnetic
Radiation
Materials Science and Metallurgy
Meteorology and Hydrology

EASTERN EUROPE

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs
Scientific Affairs

Economic and Industrial Affairs

CHINA

Political, Sociological and Military Affairs
Economic Affairs
Science and Technology

RED FLAG
Agriculture
Plant and Installation Data

WORLDWIDE

Telecommunications Policy, Research and
Development
Nuclear Development and Proliferation

Environmental Quality
Epidemiology

FBIS DAILY REPORT

China
Soviet Union
South Asia
Asia and Pacific

Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Latin America
Middle East and Africa

To order, see inside front cover

10 June 1983

JAPAN REPORT

No. 173

CONTENTS

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

- JSP Journal Carries Discussion on LDP 'Crisis'
(Shigeru Ito, et al.; GEKKAN SHAKAITO, Apr 83) 1

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

- Nuclear Energy Development in Nation Discussed
(Takashi Mukaibo; NOTIZIARIO DELL'ENEA, Feb 83) 23

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JSP JOURNAL CARRIES DISCUSSION ON LDP 'CRISIS'

Tokyo GEKKAN SHAKAITO in Japanese Apr 83 pp 28-50

[Panel discussion held by Diet member Shigeru Ito, Ritsusei University Professor Yasusaburo Hoshino, journalist Mo Takano, and GEKKAN SHAKAITO editor Masakatsu Takagi: "Nakasone Regime and the Crisis of the LDP"]

[Text] American Pressure on the Inception of the Nakasone Regime

Moderator: Thank you for taking time out from your busy schedules to participate in these discussions today. I would like to analyze the Nakasone regime today under the general theme, "the Nakasone regime and the crisis of the LDP."

Since the inception of the Nakasone regime we have heard from his own mouth such rightwing foreign policy terms as "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and "sealing of the four straits," as well as talk of sealane defense, revision of the wording of the constitution, transfer of military weapons technology, and anti-Soviet, pro-United States remarks.

On the economic side, clearly coming into focus is a rightwing characteristic exemplified by the total elimination of all welfare budget allocations in favor of the application of such expenditures of defense costs. If the people continue to entrust the political situation to this regime, what will happen to Japan? We have great fears concerning these questions. Already, under the JSP's leadership, there is a movement to introduce a resolution in the Diet calling for a declaration to strip Tanaka of his status as a Diet member. It appears that the people's criticism of Nakasone, based on newspaper polls, is steadily increasing. Now, today, we want to ask you gentlemen to discuss these points from a variety of angles.

First, as one of the preconditions to analyzing the Nakasone regime, we would like to ask your thoughts on the question of conservative politics. As you are aware, "Nakasone" is a so-called poor second within the conservative camp. Ordinarily, he would be in the anti-mainstream position, but, with the help of Tanaka and Kishi, he has attained the prime ministership. Therefore, with this abnormal regime having taken over as the conservative mainstream, what kind of changes will be wrought? Or should we not look at it in those terms? In any case we think it behooves us to make a summary study of conservative politics since the end of the war. First of all, at this point, we should like to have Mr Takano give us an outline of conservative politics.

Takano: Beginning with the circumstances leading to the inception of the Nakasone regime, I believe that there was in particular strong U.S. dissatisfaction with regard to the Suzuki regime's defense policies. Last summer, former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi began making moves. Tanaka was told, "Suzuki is not good, the United States is angry," and Kakuei Tanaka concluded that if the situation was that bad, there was no alternative, and thus was born the "Its no good any more" thesis which brought Nakasone into the limelight. The most aggravating element as far as the United States was concerned was that despite the fact that the bureaucracy--MITI, the Foreign Ministry and, of course, the Defense Agency--had all given their signoff approving military technology cooperation with the United States, Suzuki adamantly refused to give his final stamp of approval. The situation called for someone who could overcome this situation, and so it was that the winds blew in from across the Pacific--Kishi is truly a bellwether type who is particularly sensitive to the winds that blow in from the Pacific, and his actions are what triggered the change in the political picture last fall.

There are perhaps many ways of evaluating Mr Suzuki, but it is said that he is a dove from the bottom of his heart, and for this reason he obstinately refused to give his approval, saying: "I will not give my stamp of approval." If we trace this line of thinking within the LDP, I believe that the mainstream of conservative thinking ever since Yoshida's days has been to try to keep military spending down as much as possible in favor of economic growth. I believe this line of reasoning has been in greatest preponderance within the Suzuki faction (although it is now the Miyazawa faction). Therefore, rather than being dovish, they are opposed more from the standpoint of the line of thinking since the Yoshida days. On the other hand, I believe that the Suzuki-Miyazawa line basically thinks in terms of abiding by the constitution. In contrast, the Reagan administration's thinking is that such a stance is very troublesome. There is also the Kishi-Tanaka line of thinking. This is why I think the Nakasone regime came into being.

In this context, I think that a tremendous change is underway because of the advent of the Nakasone regime, and it is eminently clear that the intent is to again make Japan a mighty military country and there is an unprecedented increase in the danger of changing even the constitution.

A Policy Problem Within the LDP

There are, again, many varied evaluations concerning Shigeru Yoshida, whom the leftwing has summarily dismissed as a "traitor." Certainly, I don't say that this was unfounded, but we must remember that a basic demand of the Americans as part of the task of terminating their occupation was that a 300,000-man army utilizing former military officers be established. Arguing that such demands were unreasonable, Yoshida procrastinated and finally came up with the police reserves, which represented only a partial meeting of the American requirement, so in a sense this aspect of Yoshida must be regarded as being to his credit. On this foundation Japan's high growth was achieved, so, given the U.S.-Japan power relationships at the time, we must accept this as the best that could have been achieved. Such a statement may sound overly sympathetic to Yoshida, but objectively speaking, with the leftwing not in a position of power to force any other options on the Americans, it appears that within the overall context, this was about the best option that could have been taken.

In today's timeframe, the Suzuki-Miyazawa faction appears to have inherited that line of thinking in toto. You have mentioned a crisis of the conservatives, and I think that their period of crisis is about to start. From what we have heard, Miyazawa will rally his entire faction and oppose a military buildup and constitutional revision moves by Nakasone. In this regard, not only Miyazawa, but all of the factional leadership is said to be strengthening its stance. Internal LDP politics does not often move on policy issues alone, but Ohira is reputed to have said at one time, "It will, in the final analysis, develop into a policy issue," so I am led to believe that the LDP is about to reach that final stage.

Kakuei Tanaka and the Tanaka faction, I believe, at the present stage are following the broad sweep of the Yoshida style. Recently Kakuei Tanaka has been different, but he has repeatedly said that the constitution is not something that should be frequently tampered with. If it does not have to be changed, it is obvious that it should be left alone. I believe that the whole of the Tanaka faction also adheres to the philosophy of giving priority to economics. Several years ago, Tanaka joined the Independent Constitutional Revision Diet Members' League headed by Nobusuke Kishi. Since then he has on occasion spoken out for constitutional revision, so the word is that he is, after all, a hawk. However, this is a much more basic matter. Being backed to the wall on the Lockheed issue, Tanaka, in order to prevail within the LDP, needs to join hands with Nobusuke Kishi. It is a form of strategy that has brought him closer in line with Kishi on the question of security policy. If one were to probe deeper, I don't believe that either Tanaka as an individual or the faction as a whole is terribly interested in pursuing a policy for greater rearmament, constitutional revision or military might.

In today's TOKYO TIMES, Torao Ozawa responds in an interview: "For 30 years after the war Japan has had a free ride in security matters, and without extending its hand in defense matters it has acquired national strength. This has been the thinking of the mainstream of the conservatives ever since Yoshida's days. However, times are different now. Because of such heroic statements we are constantly being misunderstood. Nakasone's close associates also have to be cautioned on this score." So, even one of the caretakers of the Tanaka faction such as Torao Ozawa is saying that Nakasone is stupid. I believe this sort of thinking is at the base of the LDP. Now, the Tanaka faction, which has the biggest "army," must see to the preservation of Nakasone. From another quarter, Miyazawa is undoubtedly going to come up with some fairly specific policy recommendations. Just which way is he going to fall? Whichever way he decides to go, the one thing for certain is that a substantial schism over this policy issue will have been created within the LDP. I believe the question of what to do will be resolved later, but how deep to make that schism and the question of whether the opposition will be able to muster that kind of pressure is the crux of the problem.

The Basic Ideology of the Conservative Mainstream

Ito: Since the inception of the Nakasone cabinet at the end of last year, our impression has been strengthened that we are engaged in Diet struggles on a different level and under different circumstances than in the past. We have gained a stronger perception that a much graver danger has arisen than just the continued extension of conservative politics as in the past. From such a vantage point, how are we to grapple with the theme provided us today concerning postwar conservative politics and the Nakasone cabinet? An accurate comprehension of this issue is very important, not only for an immediate future response, but also for a medium-term response.

Needless to repeat, a situation different from before has arisen, and that was the situation seen also at the time of the cabinet establishment. It is described as the "Meiji 1-Chome Police Box Cabinet" or the "Tanaka-Nakasone Cabinet," and it is a situation that had a great many of the LDP personages surprised as well. Also, looking at the 1983 budget, there is a great increase in military expenditure and a decrease in welfare and educational expenditure. The budget is said to be the face of the government, but I believe that it is the face of the military. In addition, the visit to South Korea and the visit to the United States and the subjects that were brought out at those meetings are as previously stated. I believe Mr Hoshino will mention that the constitutional revision question is already at the stage as we have speculated. In this context, Prime Minister Nakasone frequently refers to "postwar accounting," "challenge the taboos" and "break the taboos." Whatever the case, if we observe Prime Minister Nakasone's words and activities over the past several months, we cannot but realize that something of a different nature and level has entered the picture.

Then, what was it heretofore and what is it now? The following are reasonable deductions that can be made. In the narrow sense, beginning with Yoshida and flowing through Ikeda, Sato, Ohira, Suzuki and eventually Miyazawa, we can call them the conservative mainstream. Alternatively, they can be termed the old Liberal Party lineage. There were, I think, supposedly three major governing characteristics: first, with economics as a base, a policy of creating a great nation economically, that is, economic rationalization; second, a policy of supporting the mutual security concept; and third, from the constitutional point of view, revision of the constitution. We would call it a constitutional emasculation policy. In a sense they promoted militarism, but they did not sacrifice the rules of economic development and expand militarism at the expense of overriding the economic structure.

Certainly, as was just stated, we strongly argued that Shigeru Yoshida was a reactionary, but in a sense, although he was a crafty person who brought into being the police reserves, which he later transformed into a security force and then into a Self Defense Force, when we consider the circumstances of those times or the main current of security thinking in later years, we can see the strong demands of the United States for an increase in military strength. Accepting these demands on the one hand, opposing then on the other, and craftily balancing Japan's peace constitution and the Japan Socialist Party's peace initiatives as reasons for his ambivalence, he preserved the integrity of all. The main characteristic from the fall of last year to the present has been that that policy is no longer valid.

I believe there are three major reasons why this is so. Without reference to the order of importance they are: First, the failure of the economy. Since the 1973 oil shock there have been a myriad of contradictions, a long stagnation comparable to the 1930's and worldwide recession. Within this situation there was a declaration of elimination of deficit funding in 1984 and the staking of Suzuki's political life on fiscal reform, both impossible to achieve, which acted in unison to force Zenko Suzuki to declare a state of fiscal emergency. Deficits of 3 trillion yen in 1981 and 6.15 trillion yen in 1982-- this constitutes one of the reasons their policy is no longer valid.

Second, American demands. Since the inception of the Reagan administration, the former free rider criticism has been eclipsed by that administration's demand that Japan shoulder its responsibilities as part of the world strategy. In the strictest sense, it has become impossible for the conservative mainstream to respond directly to such demands. The 1 percent level will shortly be surpassed, so they will not be able to respond in continuation of previous policy responses. I think this is the second reason their policy is no longer valid.

The third reason is, after all, the Tanaka issue. It is part of the conservative mainstream, and whether you call it crazy or fiendish, the cause of the corruption is Kakuei Tanaka and he is no longer defensible. If they continue to listen to him, it means, in the strictest interpretation, the failure of the conservative mainstream platform. At the time Zenko Suzuki stepped down, I wonder if this was not the psychologically most oppressive factor.

There are stories circulating that he was pressed by Tanaka over what would be done to help him at the time of the final trial arguments, the demand for sentencing and the judgment. It is probably correct to speculate that they think there is nothing that can be done.

It is unavoidable, given these circumstances, that the prime ministership would be given to Nakasone, who is not part of the mainstream. In the midst of these changes, the new form of open election of the prime minister came into the picture. I think these events influenced such a move. Whatever the case, the distorted postwar LDP politics are now at an important juncture. We are now faced with the question of how to deal with the cabinet, which after passing this juncture may well embark on a more dangerous path, going from a reactionary cabinet to an ultrareactionary cabinet.

Criticism of Military Expansionism in the United States

Hoshino: Basically, I agree with both gentlemen, but with respect to the inception of the Nakasone cabinet and the question of the invalidity of the present LDP policy within the world strategy concept of the United States as Mr Hoshino has pointed out, Suzuki obstinately objected to actions already approved by the bureaucracy. This, I think, is the most important point. That is why Kishi emerged on the scene to pass on the baton. The reason I think this lies in such terms as "unsinkable aircraft carrier," which for all intents and purposes presupposes that the Japanese Archipelago is a battleship and establishes Japan

as a military facility. In other words, these words deny the value of fishing and commercial vessels and look upon military values only. That is why their interpretation of "unity of destiny" is not in living and producing together, but in dying together. The 1983 "Military Situation Report" put out by the U.S. Department of Defense even points out that there is a danger that a U.S.-Soviet clash would escalate into a world war and that military balance in the Pacific and Southeast Asia is now the big issue.

Needless to say, this is based on the premise of a U.S.-Soviet clash. Nothing is said about a China-Soviet clash or a Japan-Soviet clash. It would appear that Asian and Pacific matters should be of no concern to the United States.

And Japan is a partner with the United States in terms of Asian strategy. While tied to the United States by the Treaty of Mutual Security, Japan, by virtue of its constitution, is prevented from expanding the role of its Self Defense Force outside its territorial waters or sending its forces overseas. The U.S. Department of Defense is saying that by 1984 it anticipates much more of a relaxation of these limitations. This, I think, is a most important point.

However, a great deal of criticism is developing in the United States against Reagan's fanatical military expansion policy. There is a question growing as to whether he will be reelected. Nakasone was a naval (finance) lieutenant, so undoubtedly the Japanese Archipelago appears only as a battleship in his mind. And he goes blithely on his way. But this is not the policy of the security treaty mainstreamers. There will unquestionably be some severe internal opposition, and is it not also true that considerable criticism is developing from among the LDP supporters?

Some time ago, when the Shin Jiyu Club disintegrated, the problems concerned were political ethics and constitutional revision. In that sense, aside from whether this situation will develop into one which will bring about a disintegration, isn't it true that in terms of policy determination, they are placed in a dangerous situation?

Stated another way, I think that it is important for us to emphasize the fact that our policy of preserving the constitution is the only road to take, not only for Japan, but for Asia and all mankind.

Takano: A considerable amount of criticism is developing within America itself against military expansionism. Even in today's newspaper, a former Pacific area commander has begun severely criticizing Reagan's military expansion policy. His question is, what can come of building more nuclear weapons? Another former military leader is reported to be stumping the country on this issue. This is the present situation. Last October BUSINESS WEEK ran a very good special report entitled "Guns and Butter." We are no longer in an era of butter or guns. Both butter and guns must be sliced. It is not a question of guns or butter, but rather, neither guns nor butter. Consensus on this thesis is practically universal within American economic circles.

On 25 January this year, the WALL STREET JOURNAL carried a two-page paid advertisement. It was a tremendous appeal effort which was sponsored by about 500 former cabinet members, economic figures, lawyers, and educators who called for a nonpartisan move to rise against the soon-to-be \$200 billion budget deficit, which, if left alone, will become a national crisis which will result in the downfall of America. In order to avert this disaster, they claimed it would be necessary to cut back on welfare and military expenditures and to increase taxes and eliminate the \$175 billion deficit expected by 1985. The 500 persons in this mass appeal are all powerful representatives of the so-called eastern establishment. I don't think the Reagan administration will be able to resist the power of this pressure group. The American economy is in such a condition that it cannot continue injecting the narcotic of military expansion. It has now reached a point of terminal illness.

Just because they are capitalists does not mean that they can commit military waste indefinitely. It is somewhat like taking drugs--they feel good at first, but as the volume needed increases, it becomes increasingly painful, and in the end the body eventually dies. I wonder if both the United States and the Soviet Union are not now in that situation. There is resistance by the military, there are interests of the military industries, and the truth is that they are wandering about in this sort of milieu. Undoubtedly changes will appear in America during the latter 2 years of Reagan's administration.

I believe this will have an effect on Japan in two ways. One aspect is that the United States, feeling that it can no longer carry the burden for Japan, will insist on a military reduction so Japan can carry on alone. The other is that military expansionism is over in the United States as expressed by the people. I think both elements will be acting on the situation. I think that the response is going to be a very complicated one. So, rather than have an odd one like Nakasone come into the picture, it would have been better to let the Suzuki regime have a little longer life muddling along, and wait until the Reagan administration fell apart.

Last year I frequently said jokingly that strategically now is the time to help Suzuki and the mutual security mainstreamers, but if this situation progresses in some peculiar way, it would be disastrous because the U.S. situation is in a state of flux. There has certainly been a great deal of severe pressure demanding defense in the past 10 years. That situation is changing on the U.S. side, and as I said before, there are two effects that will appear, so it is not a matter of the situation going away because America changes, but it seems to me that it would have been better if we had let Suzuki's wishy-washy policy remain for a while longer.

The Wall of the Interpretation/Revision Argument

Ito: The American structure and the Japanese conservative structure have some similarities. They also share some differences. I visited the German Democratic Republic with Chairman Katsumata of the Theory Center last year and participated in seminars with members of the German Science Academy. The theme that was especially suggested by the other side was that Japan, without expending large funds for military purposes, was able to enjoy economic success, and

they wanted detailed explanations on this matter. Their interest was the opposite of attacking the government, as is the case in Japan. I stated two things to them at the time. First, there definitely are an economic faction and a political faction in Japan's political structure in general--it is hard to state in specific terms--for instance, Kishi and Fukuda are representative of the hardcore political faction era.

Subsequently, there was the economic faction extending from Ikeda to Ohira. There are these currents, so, in times when the economic faction held sway, there was a tendency to check a military buildup for it was at the expense of economic rationalization. The figures alone would indicate that in the fifties there was a period of military expenditures surpassing 2 percent of GNP. With the advent of the economic faction, the pattern has been 1-1.5 percent, but Japan's GNP has risen so rapidly that a first stage defense, a second stage, a third stage, and then a fourth stage in defense programs were devised. A three-stage defense--subordinate defense, joint defense and eventually responsible defense--is the pattern of these changes.

I explained that this facet did exist, but the defense establishment and the U.S. demands were now so strong that this framework was inadequate in responding to the present situation.

The other aspect of the two points I explained to them concerned the economic faction. In thinking of the period of the conservative mainstream and considering the themes of war and peace and those times, or the peace movement and military expansion policy and their power relationships in Japan, their strength derives from the strength of the people, including popular opinion, the various peace movements of the fifties, the mutual security movements of the sixties, and the various movements from the sixties to the mid-seventies, and not from the balance of seats in the Diet alone.

Looking at today's LDP Nakasone cabinet, the conservative mainstream or the constitutional interpretation revision theory has finally come up against a wall, and they have no alternative but to entrust it to Nakasone. And Nakasone is a person with an extremely dangerous and intense personality. I wonder if it would not be correct to say that that part of the LDP prone to running impulsively toward danger has joined with the intense character of Nakasone the individual and is painting this extremely danger-filled image.

However, I don't believe Japanese financial circles as a group or the LDP as a whole are strictly of one coloration. Even from the financiers' point of view, the Japanese economy cannot exist without a peaceful system. Therefore, many cracks are developing within the LDP as well. Notwithstanding the existence of such non-Nakasone coloration factors, there is no alternative to Nakasone, nor did they have the power to somehow prolong, as you mentioned earlier, the Suzuki regime.

Moderator: There is an element within the LDP that does claim that Suzuki was incompetent. What are your thoughts in this regard?

Takano: I believe this question boils down to what is the basis under which he is judged to be incompetent. I believe there are diametrically opposed evaluations. Even as he was, he was a fairly crafty fellow. For instance, military hardware technology is one issue. And he did not sidle up to Tanaka in the manner that Nakasone did. These are the opposing views, I believe. He is certainly incompetent in the eyes of the Americans. Just for uttering "alliance" he fired the foreign minister, and on top of that he would not transfer military technology. I guess their reaction would be: "What is this, anyway!"

Japanese Economy Under Peace

Hoshino: I believe it was around the end of January that NHK aired a program on TV of a New Year's party held by the munitions industry. The basic difference from the past was that heretofore this had been considered a nuisance and eliminated, but it is now out in the open. The people attending the party all talked in a lively fashion, quite well received since the advent of the Nakasone cabinet. It was pointed out how drastically different things are now. One other thing I would have liked them to have commented on was that a great many active members of the Defense Agency were present. What was the fee they paid for attending? Most likely, they were invited, so it is a form of corruption. I was shocked by the openness with which they talked.

Ito: In the broad flow of the Japanese economy, I don't think it is possible for a military economy to continue holding a considerably large share. Mitsubishi is the largest Japanese company engaged in munitions production. I checked on the share that military production held within the total sales of Mitsubishi and found it to be 7 percent. In terms of monetary figures, it is about 200-300 billion yen. That is one aspect.

Another is the world infrastructure fund which has been discussed from time to time recently. This so-called fund for rebuilding the world is under the management of a senior managing director of the Mitsubishi General Research Center. Using Mr Doko as its chairman, they managed to establish the organization. Now, travelling about the world giving lectures, they claim their response is good. The essence of their lectures is to urge a reduction of 10 percent annually in the \$600 billion military budget, and to have America, the EC and Japan as well as OPEC--OPEC is no longer valid--to have them contribute \$3 billion each into a fund which would be used to build a causeway across the Bering Straits, a power plant in the Himalayas, and a lake twice the size of Japan in the middle of Africa. These are their stated goals. When I look at this I think, what a bunch of foxy rogues Japanese capitalists are. And a JAL former president in addressing newly hired employees always impresses on them, peace. He states that our civil aviation industry flourishes because of peace, that peace is the most important thing in the world. That is true, of course, since airfields are being bombed and major catastrophes are erupting all the time in the Middle East.

And now Japanese firms with large capital are increasing and joining the ranks of international firms, so, in a sense, it is easy for them to become "merchants of death." An island nation, a nation without natural resources, from the

structural point of view, Japan needs peace. It stands on both sides of the fence however. Because of the recession, in terms of immediate business, it relies on a military economy, but from the overall capitalist point of view, I believe it is aware that structurally, continuing with the military will only lead to the destruction of the Japanese economy.

With respect to the issue of war and peace, I believe today's problems are different from those in the past. I was in charge of peace movements for many years in which theoretically we decried monopolism, saying this was a peace movement, but now antimonopolism, peace and military reduction are not equal and cannot be used in the same equation. We are now at a juncture requiring a peaceful coexistence system with a very broad base. The LDP, I believe, is incapable of even coming up with a future vision directed toward such a goal.

Hoshino: I am fully in accord with you. I believe the reason the conservative mainstream took this course is because Japanese financiers basically drew up this tactic. I want to emphasize the necessity of what I said about the elements that are making such a noise over Nakasone's emergence. Another thing is that while it is said that the exhortations by the JAL may be for peace, their statements have something to do with "the unsinkable aircraft carrier." As you know it is legal under the Self Defense Agency Law for fishing boat activities to be restricted in favor of maneuvers with compensation. But the danger therein is found in such incidents as the Nichiyo Maru incident and the joint maneuvers held in the Japan Sea which go beyond the activities of fishing operations....

And it is odd that Land Self Defense Force maneuvers are not accompanied by traffic restrictions and Air Self Defense Force maneuvers do not restrict civil aircraft operations, while only fishing craft and fishing operations are restricted or prohibited. Fishing boat operations can be controlled at the level of small and medium-size businesses, whereas if there was an attempt to control air traffic or land traffic, the civilian companies would violently oppose it. The reason for the occurrence of the Shizaku Ishi incident of All Nippon Airways is that there was no such opposition. The Self Defense Force Law was drafted with absolutely no provision for war. Rather, there is certainly the thinking that Japan's economy can be sustained only under peaceful conditions.

Ito: In a limited sense, the conservative mainstream became bankrupt or collided with a wall, and the danger element called Nakasone was born. This sort of issue must be discussed in an international perspective in conjunction with Mr Takano's earlier statement regarding America. Whether you discuss politics or economics, whatever you may think, I believe we are now in an era when we must think in terms of Japan vis-a-vis the world, or what is the point of Japan with regard to the world. Without such a perspective, we cannot understand anything.

In this context, we are also still in the process of learning. How are we to understand and what issues can we argue about for the future. And on this scene emerges an extremely dangerous man wearing the uniform of a naval lieutenant, or rather a man giving the impression of an army commander acting like a front-line unit commander, as the prime minister who cannot meet these challenges. As a variety of conditions in America changed, the schema of east-west systems

crumbled some time ago, the relationship among the East, West, North and South is very complex. It is more accurate to say that the alliances are more north-north, south-south, east-east and west-west. Furthermore, we can say that the world has now entered a period of extremely complicated muddiness. There is the need for OPEC to reduce prices, there is the situation of world monetary crisis due to the inability of developing nations to repay their debts, there is the situation wherein strikes by the Polish "Solidarity" union force a West German bank president to shoot himself. The end result is that in this serious world recession there seems to be no way out. No matter how often summits are held, no solution is forthcoming. And the Soviet Union and the United States are following a very hard line with regard to the way out.

Normally, Japan, under the principles of its peace constitution, should declare to the world, "Gentlemen, please be calm," but it is not in a position to do so.

Since last year a group of us middle-level Diet members have been engaged in debates with our counterparts in the various factions of the LDP. They all have an appreciation of this problem. It is important that they argue their points from the standpoint of the LDP within the world structure, but they claim that neither they nor their factional leaders have that capability. Someone was saying that heretofore politics have meant listening to demands. The pie kept getting bigger and bigger, and all they had to do was to cut off pieces and say, here is your portion, labor unions, and here is yours, small and medium enterprises. But now, the pie can't get any bigger; even though there may be 17 demands, only two or three can be met. The question that is raised now is how to make the determination, based on society's perceptions, as to how the two or three will be dealt with.

The first postwar era was that of Yoshida and Hatoyama, the second that of Ikeda and Sato, the third era was that of Miki, Tanaka, Ohira and Fukuda. We are now in the fourth era. How that will be led will determine the quality of that leadership. While lacking a view of the future, they have had to choose Nakasone; no other would do.

Structural Contradictions in the Nakasone Policy

Takano: Nakasone has no economic policy and is incapable of resolving any economic issues. The economic contradictions within Japan must be dealt with in terms of what is to be done worldwide, and there can be no resolution based on one nation's capitalistic solutions. This is true with respect to any country. In this context I think that what Mr Ito mentioned about the theory of a world infrastructure is a rather good idea.

Ito: When I questioned him on this in the budget committee, Mr Nakasone was in agreement. But there was not enough time to go into depth to the point that reduction of military expenses is tantamount to the [infusion of new] funds. I will mention it at the summit, is what he said. He absolutely does not understand.

Takano: The opposition has to think about this more seriously, because it is a variant of the theory of world reform, and by taking the initiative in the movement we find meaning for Japan, particularly in the context of transfer of technology and capital to the Third World countries. There is the question of what to do about immediate finances, but in the broad sense, the big choices Japan must make are whether to take on a world military role or to take on an initiative in another area. These are the issues that the conservatives are being pressed to address themselves to now. Of course, all of the Japanese people are pressed to come up with a response. The conservatives are unable to come to grips with policy in this area, but at the same time the situation is such that we in the opposition somehow cannot seem to come up with any initiatives of our own in policy choices and thus meld ourselves with the public.

Ito: The present Nakasone policy, I believe, both structurally and necessarily, has clashed due to great contradictions, and this clash has now come to the surface. I believe there are generally four or five areas. First, an international contradiction. A Chinese-Soviet reconciliation or normalization is taking place. We also would like to be friends with China and expand our relations with it. And in America there is military expansion and arms reduction. It is definitely a double track; Reagan is using both sides of the coin, so to be oblivious of what is going on and just stare at one side of the coin is stupid. If matters proceed as they are at present, things will be difficult for the Soviets as well. With the burden of Afghanistan and Poland being heavy, in terms of peaceful coexistence of arms reduction, something has to be done to ease the strain on their people. And, of course, there are the developing countries, in which according to a World Bank study 600-700 hundred million persons live at the absolute poverty level, only a step above starvation. Japan is the contact point for all of the North, South, East and West countries, and for this reason it has a role to play but Nakasone is at the opposite end of the spectrum. And this includes the textbook revision issue. Also, when Mr Nikaido visited China, his statements regarding Japan's present situation and the Nakasone cabinet were filled with polite sarcasm. In this context Japanese international contradictions and international isolation cannot help but rapidly surface.

Second, I believe there are contradictions within the conservative camp as well. Even within the LDP there are young members who want to protect the constitution and oppose its revision. When we are talking with them, they say: well, I am in touch with the electorate and I am repeating their views without additions or editing. We can also assume that in some respects they will not change their thinking. I don't know how successful Miyazawa will be at putting forward his own vision to counter the dangerous Nakasone cabinet, because he is doing his best at this point to clean up within his faction, but whatever the case, I think many contradictions within the conservatives, within the financiers who support them, and within their own organization will surface. If you look at the financial world as a whole, you will come to the conclusion that they are looking at Nakasone's actions with coolness. I don't believe there is any attitude of intense support.

Third, above all, there is peace, an antinuclear attitude, arms reduction and the public's resistance to detrimental constitutional revision. There is no outlook that a smooth passage can be expected for the bill for detrimental revision of the constitution, the details of which are presently being drafted by Mr Setoyama, which will require a two-thirds vote in the Diet and a vote of acceptance by the public.

Another contradiction is the public's livelihood--the budget with its military look and unavoidable large-scale tax increase for 1984.

I have thus raised some four points where there will be a collision both structurally and naturally with major contradictions. I believe that these contradictions will surface rather quickly. There are some which have already come to light. Because these have become public, Nakasone administration figures have quickly stopped using such terms as unsinkable aircraft carrier and blockade of the four straits, and are trying to take up three other slogans. The first is education; the second is, I understand, greenery--supposedly each family is to plant two trees; and the third is, I believe, family. The bellwether school and the frontal attack school directly contradict each other, but both are being displayed to the fullest now.

Ideologically It is Fascism

Takano: Education, which you just mentioned, has the elements of kill or be killed. I assume Nakasone is looking to the right timing, but in his thinking there is a strain of thought that restoration, from the conservative side, means revolution. I believe it was in July 1981 in a speech he made at a meeting of Kazuo Yatsugi's National Policy Research Council that he said: "Administrative reform according to Mr Yatsugi consists of the initial restoration, the Meiji Restoration, the loss of the war as the second restoration, and this next restoration, administrative restoration, should be the third. Conceptually I believe that it should be such a restoration." "In any event administrative restorations have only been accomplished by Meiji and MacArthur. It is not something that can be accomplished by peaceful means. I was warned by Nobusuke Kishi that without a coup d'etat or revolution, it could not be accomplished."

When applied to the constitution, the Meiji period is the first constitutional era, the postwar period is the second constitutional era. And Nakasone, I believe, has the self-serving image that he is the one to lead the way to the third constitutional era. He has stated: "I believe that the most important thing after the second provisional study is an extraordinary provisional study on education. I do not envision a small-scale technical dissertation on educational reform such as the Middle School Advisory Report, but I believe a large-scale study that delves into a reform of the basic educational system is needed. Administrative reform is, in effect, a spiritual pilot for such reform. This is apparently the ultimate goal of Nakasone, to proceed from administrative reform to educational reform. And constitutional revision will be next. Within Nakasone resides this three-tier program. As I have said elsewhere, administrative reform is not simply a financial matter. Within a nation's administrative authority resides defense, diplomacy and education, and there is finance. He intends to utilize all of these effectively.

In a word, Nakasone's idea of administrative reform means a hardened national fighting mechanism, not one that is flabby. With such a situation, the financial aspects may be a bit better. Therefore, the next step after administrative reform is to change the thinking of the public. To change the educational system--which is connected with this--means that he will then be able to do something with the constitution which will bring about the third constitutional era. There are pros and cons to this. There is certainly a feeling on the part of the public, "if the teachers were only a little more substantial," and this gives him the opening to touch on the question of educational reform. I believe it is a very precarious point.

Hoshino: The third constitutional era--it sounds like Hitler's Third Reich. Ideologically, I believe it is fascist. At the same time, I don't know what ideology promoted administrative reform, but they are saying the same thing: "The current administrative reform should seek to attain its goals by looking back over the 200 years of history since the Meiji Restoration and the democratization in the 30 years following the war. The reform should lay the basis for the nation and the people to redefine the path they should take. If the present administrative reform is viewed in this light...etc., etc. In other words it matches what he is saying in that the postwar politics need to be reviewed and that there were three basic goals in postwar Japan.

One was democracy patterned after advanced foreign countries; second, a policy based on a passive stance; and third, a welfare policy based on raising material living standards. This all ended in 1975. This was included in the basic draft but was not mentioned in the report. This is fraught with danger similar to admitting the ideologies and dangers of Hitler and Mussolini.

Military Expansion Policy of Realities First

Takano: Japan's democratic "corruption" is like the final period of the Weimar. Isn't this the kind of impression we get?

Ito: When we talk of administrative reform, I think three points emerge. First, there is the project of the late Prime Minister Ohira. It ended up incomplete, but in reading its concept of the future of society, one comes to the conclusion that he was searching for the meaning of a new national objective in this day and age of no national objectives. There is the basis of economics, support for mutual security, and interpretive reform of the constitution. While the conservative position is different from ours, I think there was an intent to search for and find a way in his actions.

The next bad thing is the special investigation report. When reading the many reports leading up to the final report, one finds nothing but a simple rationalization theory. What should the future Japanese society be like and how will the administrative reform affect Japan's future are the requirements for the report, but it is nothing more than a simple statement of philosophy.

And so Nakasone became prime minister after a stint as director of the Administrative Management Agency. The worst in the Nakasone image vis-a-vis administrative reform. I guess it is the Nakasone ideology. As has been frequently mentioned, at a men's rally at the Seicho-no-Ie in May of last year, he said: "I am going to carry out a major housecleaning with administrative reform, and after the room is straightened up, I will install a wonderful constitution." The third imperial nation--it follows the path of Hitler. There were three conservatives, and the worst of the lot is now the representative of the country. However, I want to ask Mr Hoshino: With Mr Nakasone's emergence, can it now be said that the long, bad road of constitutional revision has entered a new situation? Within the LDP itself there is excitement among constitutional revisionists.

However, I do not believe there is any forecast of constitutional revision in the foreseeable future. In any event, the situation is that a constitutional revision for the worse can no longer stand, nor can interpretive constitutional revision. How should we evaluate the present Nakasone debut within the context of its long-range constitutional revision plans?

Hoshino: Let us leave that point until later....The situation is now very similar to the period of the Manchurian Incident which developed into the China Incident and later into the Pacific war. Konoe's policy was nonexpansionism, nonexpansionism, but the field military units were adopting an expansionism, expansionism policy. It finally resulted in the downfall of the Konoe cabinet, a second and a third phase, and eventually it went to Tojo. This all points to the fact that control rested in the emperor. The cabinet, and much less the Diet, could not exercise any control.

What I think is dangerous now is that the Japanese Self Defense Force and the U.S. military are like the former Kwangtung Army. The actuality is expansion, following an expansionist policy. Because criticism of Nakasone has been increasing his administration members are saying primarily defense and activity within the framework of the constitution, but this is only paying lipservice to nonexpansionism. The danger point is in this area. The main point is the fact that control rests with the U.S. military. I saw telecasts of last December's joint Japan-U.S. military maneuvers in Hokkaido. They were speaking in English. If Japan is really conducting primarily defense maneuvers, they should be teaching Japanese to the Americans. That is the danger. Furthermore, they are only provoking the Soviets there.

And then there is the issue of the U.S.-Japanese meetings. Japan thinks of itself as an independent nation. The Japanese prime minister always makes a pilgrimage to Washington. It is the same as the alternative residence in Tokyo requirements of the feudal lords. The normal procedure would be for the prime minister to tell the nation through the forum of the Diet what his position on negotiations with the United States are, and then he should depart on his trip. Thus, basically Japan is still not an independent nation. The prime minister is just like the former governors general of Taiwan or Korea. Thus, when the trip is set he goes to Washington, pledges his loyalty and asks what he should do. He then comes back with his instructions, but if he told the truth he could no longer retain control, so he finesses it with whatever will be agreeable to the public.

The irresponsible evasiveness of Nakasone to the questioning of the opposition in the current Diet is proof that Japan is not an independent nation and that he is nothing but a governor general. As a great many newspapers have strongly indicated, there was no previous meeting which bore out the strong personal relationship such as that between Nakasone and Reagan. One of the basic reasons for this is that they may have a mutual feeling of isolation or communal destiny in a world in which their military expansion policies are no longer valid.

Takano: It is the hardcore of the Reagan-Nakasone policy isn't it?

Hoshino: Yes, yes. And I don't know if that makes them homosexuals or not, but Nakasone has said that if Reagan falls, I will quit, and if he dies, so will I. I don't care what he does personally, but I cannot condone his roping in the people. What is dangerous now is that the military are joined to them and are building up a store of de facto results. The question is, how much of this can be verified. I believe the danger is in this area.

Takano: In terms of factual priority, one has to backtract considerably, but basically I think there is the argument that this is a legacy of the Fukuda administration. During the Fukuda period there was a lot of progress in working out the guidelines for U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation. In November 1978, on the very day when Mr Ohira won the primary vote for the LDP presidency, the Defense Agency and the Pentagon held a formal signing of these guidelines. The newspapers were all agog over the LDP primary elections, so this news was given scant attention at the bottom of the page. If you read these guidelines it will be quite evident that they are addressing the question of how Japan can conduct joint military efforts with the U.S. military and assume responsibility for the defense of Asia. It is a revision of the Mutual Security Treaty in that it brings Japan to the level of an allied nation involved in world security activity. Thus, it revised one of the limitations built into the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty.

But we did not react so sensitively to this change. And based on these changes, various studies on joint strategies are progressing. And to test out these strategies, a number of joint maneuvers including South Korean forces are in progress. The actual situation now seems to be moving to the stage of involvement with the Pacific basin nations.

Because these guidelines basically incorporate the concept of shouldering the responsibility for security in Asia, this will in fact force a nominal revision of the Mutual Security Treaty, and that will naturally lead to a revision of the constitutional, all in a single package. Otherwise, the gears will not mesh. This movement all began in November 1978. Furthermore, I believe that it has taken the form of joint strategy, joint military maneuvers in creating a fait accompli situation.

The Suzuki administration was wishy-washy about this situation, but since the assumption of power by Nakasone, the term "unsinkable aircraft carrier" has come out. In other words, I think that the priority of reality has finally come out in the open politically. In that context, if the Nakasone regime were to be in power for 4 years, the question of Mutual Security Treaty revision and constitutional revision would eventually come about. It is a fearful thing to consider that this will come to pass because the reality of the situation is taking precedence.

To say one more thing about reality, there was the formation last autumn of the "People's Congress to Protect Japan." What is frightening about it is that it is assuming the appearance of a budding people's movement for legislation. Its strength lies in the fact that it even pulled the Komeito into this movement. While keeping a rightist oriented religious group as the central core of its organization, it has all of the Domei labor union officials participating at the local level. I was recently invited by SOHYO and went to Shiga, where about 30 of our people were attending study classes, but on the previous day about 5000 had gathered for a rally of the "People's Congress to Protect Japan." Their roots have expanded considerably in the local areas. A bottom-up people's movement to revise the constitution is proceeding apace.

Opposition to Human Rights in the Constitutional Revision

Hoshino: "The People's Congress to Protect Japan" has put out a white paper on education in which it puts the blame for delinquency among youth, violence and educational decline in the constitution. Three points are raised. First, the present constitution over emphasizes the aspect of rights, which leads to self-interest and violence. Second is the problem of sex crimes, which is due to the proliferation of pronography stemming from section 21 which allows freedom of expression. Third is section 20 in which politics and religion are separated. This does not allow for education with respect to suicides and respect for the value of life. It is a stupid situation, but the congress is using very skillful arguments. Mr Ito made the statement earlier that we should be the confluence of North, South, East and West, but it appears that the people are turning their eyes away from such international aspects. Consider, for instance the use of the Emperor's Reign Year. It means 100 million people are inconvenienced by the death of one. To think that this is the basis of a people's movement is frightening. The stupidity of this is just as incomprehensible as asking a Westerner what Showa year he was born in. This is valid only in the small island nation of Japan. It would be all right if we were about to enter into the isolation of the Tokugawa era. Closing out everything of course. Without these conditions to proclaim "Reign Years" is to close one's eyes to everything international and to concentrate only on clothing, food and housing in the small island nation of Japan.

I believe there are two ways to fight against revision of the constitution for the worse. Article 9 contains an argument against revision. One is the fact that the peaceful nature of the constitution has become a part of the people and has been the reason for the economic growth. Also, if a revision were undertaken, there would be growing fear and concern on the part of various Asian countries over the return of militarism and of Japan becoming a military superpower. I am in opposition to revision on the basis of these two points. At the time when the interim report was completed, I met with Kiyoshi Mori, the senior investigator of the fourth subgroup. I said that since the Self Defense Forces are more harmful than good and there was a danger in being tied to the Mutual Security Treaty, I was opposed to a constitutional revision. But from the LDP's standpoint, would there not be a need for some checks if there is to be primarily defense and case-by-case self-defense? For instance, there are the inclusion of the three non nuclear principles or the three principles of no munitions trade or the nondispatch of military personnel overseas, or the limitation of

military expenditure to a certain percentage of the GNP. I said that some sort of similar restrictions were absolutely vital, but he told me that they were not thinking of any nor would they allow any such limitations. This is following directly on the U.S. policy line.

Another important item is the human rights issue, regarding which, in the introductory section, there was no mention of new rights. In the section on individuals, it stated that there was no need to include in the constitution environmental rights and the right to know in the right of privacy. These are reactionary viewpoints.

When international association agreements and the UN Charter are compared, there are three distinct differences. One is that international association agreements do not contain any reference to human rights. The only exception to this pertains to the sale or exploitation of women and children. However, in the UN Charter, increasing the guarantees of human rights is the major item.

Another is in the thinking regarding military preparedness. Both are in agreement as to keeping military preparedness to a minimum, but in the international association agreements military preparations for national security and world peace are to be kept at a minimum. The UN Charter limits the diversion of national wealth and manpower for military preparedness to a minimum. The word is diversion.

And another item is that "war" is eliminated and the concept of "the threat of force and forceful action will be restrained" appears. There were the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of Children, the 1960 Declaration of Freedom of Colonies, the 1966 International Agreement on Human Rights, the 1967 Declaration Against Discrimination Against Women, the 1972 Declaration on International Human Environment, the 1975 Declaration of the Rights of Handicapped Persons, the International Women's Year, the 1979 International Year of the Child, the Treaty to Eliminate Discrimination, the 1981 Year of the Disabled, and 1983 was supposed to become the International Year of the Aged, but because the developing nations complained that the problems of the aged are not their problems yet, it will be the Year of Communications. By looking at this flow, since the institution of the private enterprise system, the situation is now moving toward a communal society in which the guarantees for the rights of children, women, disabled and the elderly, who had heretofore been considered a hindrance to the amassing of material wealth, are now getting more attention.

For this purpose a lot of natural resources and energy are needed, so if these are used for such purposes they cannot serve to build military might. Actually, the fact that arms reduction is demanded is not merely to protect peace from nuclear war but includes this sort of thing as well. To question this human rights approach, this is, the reactionary ideology, or an inability to see the future means that the foundations of the people are weak. I think it is important that this point be made clear.

Wanted, an Ability To See the Future in Reform

Moderator: Now, we can anticipate a double election of both the lower and upper houses, and while the question of constitutional revision will not likely be a debating point immediately, the activities to bring the nation to a stance amenable to a revision will gain strength. The people's choice in this matter is going to be questioned severely. I would like your views as to what should be done.

Ito: Nakasone is a type of person who goes in for frontal attack; he is a naval officer type who believes that as long as he does his best, even if he dies, he has no regret. He has the spirit that dying in battle is an honor and he has a bellwether spirit, so if he senses that opinion is against him, he can deftly change course, but I believe he will continue down a dangerous path. No matter how he changes his immediate objectives, I don't think the basic image held by the public since the start of his administration will be easily erased. This has been borne out by many very severe criticisms levied against him in a variety of polls. Today's situation is such that these have given not only Nakasone but all of the LDP a considerable shock. When considered from this standpoint, as long as he follows this dangerous course, the people's feelings about trying to stop him or trying to make him change course will continue to run deep and will grow.

If I were to say one more thing, it is that while not openly or obviously, the world is changing, so I think it is incumbent on us to increase our understanding that Japan is changing as well. Looking at the world and relationships between the big countries and between developing countries and advanced countries, there are various changes of values indicating the beginning of a new movement.

Looking at it from the domestic standpoint, needless to say there are the growing antinuclear and arms reduction movements, but I have my eyes set on a much smaller point. There is a growing number of volunteer activities in my election district. They include bringing housebound disabled persons to a public auditorium for a time of enjoyment with others, having elderly persons gather together once a month and being fed a good meal. These activities are flourishing in the cities and in the farmland. I made some severe statements at last year's constitution protection rally. Volunteers are not ordered to do things by anyone. It is strictly voluntary work; they do not get any pay from anyone, they do what is needed by society by sacrificing themselves. These people have much more value than those who are rounded up and paid to attend an assembly. No matter how many thousand people gather here, unless each and every one comes to this realization, there can be no real movement. Please listen to this advice from one who has participated in this movement for many years. This is what I said. I believe the crux of the matter is how one gets to this sort of feeling.

When we look at the situation of the world and Japan today, we can see many similarities to the dangers of the 1930's as well as differences. The Japanese people's strength in breaking the fangs of fascism comes from the confidence gained through their movements. When you think of these situations, they are

resistance struggles and positive battles to build something. Battles to build something means a step-by-step approach building against a specific image under a living constitution and under a peace constitution. I believe this sort of positiveness is important; I think also that therein lies the key to our expansion.

In this context we must raise our voices from the local autonomous elections to the national political level elections. The Socialist Party must specifically argue for the future of society. Isn't this now a time when we must exert emergency efforts along these lines? Some time ago when I met with Kanagawa Prefectural Governor Nagasu and raised the question, what is a progressive?, he responded "It is foresight." In the light of today's progressives, I would say that it is more important to understand this rather than argue progressiveness.

Look Again From the Standpoint of the World

Takano: With regard to elections, if we continue as we are now, Japan will be isolated from the broad currents of the world and will be its whipping boy for the Americans as well. We must open our eyes wide at this current of the world and think of Japan within that context. And each and every one of us must give serious thought to his proper selection of paths. I think that elections are a good chance to exercise those choices.

Another point is the question of what will be the point of argument. I believe the real point of concern will be as I discussed before, but on the other hand, there is the problem of Kakuei Tanaka and the corruption of the power of money. In terms of election strategy, might it not be to our advantage for us to take that up? That is certainly one of the options. That is certainly one of the areas we must pounce on. Tanaka the individual is not the only one; the LDP itself is corrupted by the power of money. No one doubts this, so if we attack on this point, won't it be good election strategy? We can win if we attack on the issue of money power. Tokuma Utsumoniya has said that since Nakasone's cabinet came into being they have been saying Kakuei (Kaku's shadow) but the most dangerous is Kinshiei (Kishi's shadow). This is one observation. I think that it is important for each opposition party member to make clear to the people that the first issue is here.

The other is the question of the constitution. It is not a direct point at issue but it is a hidden issue in the sense that if Nakasone's policies continue to prevail, it will eventually come to that point. We might be attacked so we must protect ourselves. We cannot just say we will protect ourselves, as Mr Ito pointed out in his remarks about volunteers; I believe that unless a lot more actual movements by the people occur in the livelihood and in the workplaces of the people based on appropriate articles of the constitution there will be no contest with the organizational efforts of the conservatives.

As more people live the constitution in their daily lives and those people exchange their experiences with others, a sort of current should be created. From within this current will it not be possible to see a future society, and not from only a theoretical standpoint? In that context I wonder if it is not

possible to come up with a tactician who could hasten the downfall of the LDP. There may have been many interesting political situations created in the past, such as Takeshi Yamazaki for premier, and now Miyazawa is beginning to believe that Nakasone is a danger. In a speech that Miyazawa made to the Yomiuri International Economic Discussion Group in the winter of 1981, he said: "The fact that such a constitution was drafted was based on circumstances extant at the time, and more than half of the people now in the country grew up under this constitution. It is not a situation in which we can turn back the clock. There is no country in history that has lived with this kind of a constitution. In a sense, it is the biggest and first experiment of its kind in history. It is difficult to understand all its ramifications from the outside. We must explain it with patience." "The thinking on this score is divided within our party. In other words, our people now have very firm thoughts on this (defense) issue. On the one hand are those who think, at this time, that it would be all right to make some drastic defense efforts, and there are others who think, no, after all the people have finally begun to have a sense of this issue so we must proceed slowly with the utmost caution. I believe Prime Minister Suzuki falls into the latter category." This is the first time in history that one has had to live with this kind of a constitution. Well, how about having him join the Socialist Party (laughter). I think there is a bit of maneuvering on his part, with a conservative mainstreamer making such statements. There are such individuals. And of course Tanaka is right in the middle. He only thinks of which way he can fall to stay in power. So, with the understanding of the existence of a constitutional revision element in the LDP, the question for us is to figure out how to create a big argument and cause a rift, and then put Nakasone's dangerous image before the people and reveal the contradiction. I believe this is an important task.

Hoshino: One point that did not come up and that is the question of what to do about the female vote. In the last double election, the female vote went mainly to the LDP, because of Mr Ohira's death primarily. But under the Nakasone policy there are fears of a possible war or conscription. The women have fought since before the war in order to protect and live in peace. For instance, there are the words of Shoko Yosano: "You must not die," If you go to war but are told not to die it is a difficult demand to meet. The slogan after the war's end, "Don't send your students off to war again," means one step before going to war.

And in 1978 in the "time of crisis" legislation: "Conscription must be accomplished even by putting your life on the line." Again, it is one step before war. And a Zen Dentsu woman labor unionist declares she will not marry a Self Defense Forces member. Also, the Memorial to the Loyal Dead and Fatherland Defense Shrine violations of the constitution litigation are carried out by women. How women have fought to preserve their lives and peace! And as an outcome of this there has been the development of litigation and a conscientious tax revolt against military expenditures, giving rise to talk to a peace tax. We exhort women to do their utmost. In past elections, men made the speeches and women were ignored, but things must be reversed. I think we should pay positive heed

to women's problems. I believe it has come to the point when it is most important to realize how criminal it is to continue military expansion and cut off social guarantees, and we must now do something about it. If we do this I think the situation will turn in our favor.

Moderator: Well, I think we should end this discussion now. Thank you very much.

9980

CSO: 4105/183

NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN DISCUSSED

Rome NOTIZIARIO DELL'ENEA in English Feb 83 Supplement ENERGIA NUCLEARE pp 48-54

[Article by Takashi Mukaibo, Acting Chairman Atomic Energy Commission Japan:
"Nuclear Energy Development in Japan"]

[Text] **The newly established long-term nuclear power programme provides for fostering the development of national economy and enhancement of living standards through nuclear energy**

OUTLINE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN

Nuclear energy has marked a quarter century of development and utilization in Japan, counting from the enactment in 1956 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law and the concomitant establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The unhappy circumstance of our first encounter with nuclear power in the form of the atomic bomb has rooted in the minds of the Japanese people a firm resolution to abstain from military nuclear applications. The fundamental principle of limiting our efforts in this field strictly to peaceful uses is clearly stipulated in our Basic Law and has become our consistent underlying policy in respect of nuclear energy development and utilization.

THE FIRST PERIOD

Looking back on the history of nuclear energy development and uti-

lization in Japan, the first ten years can be considered to have been spent in establishing the foundations for our development and utilization of nuclear energy. Thus, after the enactment of the Basic Law, there was seen the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission, which was entrusted with planning, examining and deciding the policy to be followed in the development and utilization of nuclear energy. This was followed by the setting up of various national centres of nuclear research and development, including the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, the Nuclear Fuel Corporation – which later became the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation – and the National Institute of Radiological Sciences.

Such was the national organization set up for enhancing the level of research and development in this domain, and the tools made available for pursuing these activities included the research reactor JRR-1 which attained criticality in 1957, followed in 1962 by the JRR-3 which was the first reactor designed and constructed in Japanese hands.

In respect of nuclear power generation, the first kilowatt hour of nuclear power was produced in Japan in 1963, with the JPDR – the Japan Power Demonstration Reactor, a

12.5 MWe light water reactor – installed in the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. Two years earlier saw the start of construction on a Calder Hall type commercial nuclear power station imported from Great Britain.

With the view of overcoming the handicap of our entry into the scene of nuclear research and development far behind other advanced countries, and in consideration of the limitations besetting us in respect of the natural resources indispensable for utilizing nuclear power, we proceeded to conclude with the United States an agreement for cooperation in nuclear research, followed by bilateral agreements for the supply of enriched uranium, nuclear material and equipment contracted with the United States, Great Britain and Canada. In the IAEA, Japan gained membership from its very establishment, and later became the first country to adopt the process of obtaining uranium from the Agency. Japan also actively participated in advancing the purpose of IAEA by positively accepting the nuclear safeguard measures laid down by the Agency.

THE SECOND PERIOD

The decade extending from the second half of the 1960's to the first half of the 1970's served us to assimilate the acquired technology, to provide for establishing the nuclear fuel cycle and to draw up the basic lines along which to develop our own concept of a New Type Power Reactor. For nuclear power generation, we actively pursued the line of obtaining access to the technology of light water reactors, which were considered already proven. In actual implementation, however, mastery of the acquired technology was not accomplished overnight, and called for innumerable repetitions of trial and error to reduce the frequency of unforeseen outages and raise the level of plant utilization factor. A considerable independent national effort – in terms of man power and expenditure

– was also directed to studies for verifying the operational safety aspects.

The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation – established in 1967 – undertook the development of the Advanced Thermal Reactor and the Fast Breeder Reactor – for their advantage of high neutron utilization. Other efforts have been directed by the same Corporation to research and development work required for closing the fuel cycle, including such works as uranium enrichment and on spent fuel reprocessing.

The progress of nuclear power development and utilization marking the latter part of this second decade of Japanese nuclear development was characterized by a rising public concern over the safety of nuclear installations. Much public controversy was also raised in connection with the poor records of plant load factor of nuclear power stations due to frequent and extended outages for mechanical troubles as well as for inspection and maintenance operations.


THE THIRD PERIOD

The third decade of the Japanese nuclear age – which brings us to the present time – is seeing intensified efforts in developing nuclear power generation, while active endeavours are also being made toward commercialization of domestically developed technologies related to our New Type Power Reactor and the nuclear fuel cycle. This present decade is also being characterized by an increasing international interest focussed on the question of nuclear non-proliferation.

The Experimental Fast Reactor Joyo of 100 MWt went critical in 1977, followed in the ensuing year 1978 by the Prototype Advanced Thermal Reactor Fugen of 165 MWe, and both reactors have since

**Fig. 1. LOCATION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES
IN JAPAN**

(As June 1982)



been operating without any significant troubles.

In relation to the fuel cycle, a spent fuel reprocessing plant of 0.7 ton per day capacity and an uranium enrichment pilot plant entered operation in 1977 and 1979, respectively, to mark a step forward in our advance toward practical establishment of the fuel cycle.

Our other activities in nuclear development include such subjects as the High Temperature Gas Reactor – envisaged for uses other than power generation – and nuclear ship propulsion. We are also actively extending our studies into the domain of nuclear fusion, which is expected to provide the answer to the

future energy requirements of mankind, with our aim of seeing its practical utilization in the 21st century.

During this same period, a start was also made in revising the national setup for nuclear administration: in 1978, the regulatory function was separated from the Atomic Energy Commission, to be entrusted to the newly established Nuclear Safety Commission. One objective of this change was to establish a unified and consistent system for regulatory administration of nuclear safety, of which functions were so far diversified in different parts of the government. Another aim of this reorganization was to strengthen the regulatory function of nuclear administration so as

to secure the confidence of the national public in nuclear power, and to permit reactivation of the efforts of development and utilization in this field.

The period further coincided with a world-wide move calling for reinforcement of the system to limit nuclear arms proliferation, and occasioned a political issue between Japan and the United States concerning the operation of the Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant, installed as the Tokai Establishment of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. A notable step forward was marked in this connection with the memorable conclusion that «non-proliferation is compatible with the peaceful uses of atomic energy», which was derived by the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, in which Japan also took an active part.

FUTURE TRENDS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION IN JAPAN

I have so far briefly recounted the highlights in our history of nuclear power development, and in what follows, I should like to describe our policy for the future.

We all know that the twice-repeated oil crisis has decidedly enhanced the expectations attached to nuclear energy as the staple substitute energy for oil, and with particular regard to Japan – with very scarce national energy-bearing resources – the development and utilization of nuclear energy is an indispensable necessity. It is also in this context that we are striving toward the commercial application of our New Type Power Reactor and endeavouring to close our nuclear fuel cycle. We are also fully aware of the question of non-proliferation and the need for international collaboration in nuclear research and development efforts.

These circumstances have led the Atomic Energy Commission to re-

view the situation and to re-examine our future policy in the light of such a review. The study extended over a period of sixteen months, and culminated this past June in the adoption of a new Long-Term Programme, based on which the Atomic Energy Commission will promote the development and utilization of nuclear energy in Japan.

OUTLINE OF THE NEW LONG-TERM PROGRAMME

The first point set forth in our Long-Term Programme is the size to be realized in terms of the total generating capacity of nuclear power stations. In 1981 we already had 24 stations in operation, with a total installed capacity of 17 million kilowatts, which contributed about 17 percent of the aggregate supply of electrical energy. As for the future, the plan for overall energy supply established this past April by the Japanese Government gives for 1990 a target total installed nuclear generating capacity of 46 million kilowatts to contribute 30 percent of the electrical energy supply, to be realized through intensified efforts in expanding our nuclear generating capacity. For the year 2000, we envisage a figure of 90 million kilowatts to represent 30 percent of the total installed generating capacity and to contribute 40 percent of the aggregate electrical energy supply.

To attain these objectives, we are putting the first priority on further ensuring trouble-free operations of nuclear power stations to reduce uneasiness and worries of the public, and to ensure the balanced development of the community, thus promoting smooth introduction of nuclear power stations. We are also actively tackling the problem of radioactive waste management and measures for safe decommissioning of retired nuclear reactors.

Another target in our Programme is the standardization of light water reactor design, with the view of enhancing their reliability and economy; effective contribution to this

Fig. 2: Primary Energy Supply in Japan





Fig. 3: Forecast of Balance on Uranium Enrichment



objective is expected from our projects on the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor and the Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor, undertaken jointly between Japanese utility companies and US manufacturers.

The second point emphasized in our Long-Term Programme is the establishment of the closed nuclear fuel cycle in our own hands, which is a question that also involves our choice of reactor concept. For the time being, we will rely mainly on light water reactors for power generation, and seek to ensure a stable supply of the nuclear fuel required to keep these reactors operating.

Our accumulative requirement of natural uranium is expected to amount to 130 thousand short tons in 1990, to rise in the year 2000 to 310 thousand short tons. To meet this need, we have assured ourselves of a supply of 200 thousand short tons through long-term contracts with various overseas sources. For the future, we will seek to secure stable supply of uranium ore through prospecting and exploitation of mines undertaken in our own hands in concessions acquired abroad.

Our uranium enrichment requirements should reach 8 million swu in 1990, to rise in the year 2000 to 12 million swu. We depend at present on overseas enrichment services, but we are intending to establish our own means of enrichment, through centrifuge technique, as far as practicable.

In line with this plan, the pilot centrifuge plant that entered service this year will be followed by the construction of a 200 thousand swu per year demonstration plant; our target is set at the commissioning of a commercial centrifuge enrichment plant before the end of 1980's, and to avail ourselves of an annual separative capacity amounting to 3 million swu by the year 2000.

Considering the plutonium and unburned uranium contained in spent fuel to be a virtually indigenous source of energy, we plan to take measures for their active utilization. To this end, we will reprocess

the spent fuel discharged from our power stations, and have this done in so far as practicable within our own facilities. For this purpose, our existing Tokai Reprocessing Plant is planned to be followed by a second plant of 1,200 tons per year capacity, expected to enter into service around 1990.

In future, plutonium will be burned in fast breeder reactors, whose development will be pursued with the target of achieving their successful commercial application around the year 2010. With this aim, construction will soon start on our prototype fast reactor Monju planned to reach criticality around 1990. We also expect to set about constructing a demonstration fast reactor in the early 1990's.

While awaiting the commercial application of the fast breeder reactor, and even thereafter, until these reactors become available in large scale, a considerable amount of plutonium is expected to accumulate, and we shall be burning this plutonium in reactors of our advanced thermal concept, as well as in light water reactors. The Advanced Thermal Reactor is a heavy water reactor of which concept was originated in Japan and which can burn effectively and simply both plutonium and recovered uranium. The experience gained with the 165 MWe prototype reactor Fugen – already in full operation for 3 years successfully – will serve us in our plans for advancing into the next step of constructing a 600 MWe demonstration reactor which we plan to bring to criticality in the early 1990's. This development will be paralleled by attempts of burning plutonium in light water reactors, to culminate in successful demonstration of plutonium recycle in light water reactors toward the mid-1990's.

The third point in our Long-Term Programme is the recognition that, among the various projects undertaken by the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation – which is a governmental agen-

Fig. 4: Forecast of Balance on Spent Fuel Reprocessing




TABLE I

OUTLOOK OF LONG-TERM PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN JAPAN

| I TEM | FISCAL YEAR 1980 | FISCAL YEAR 1990 | FISCAL YEAR 2000 |
|------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| PRIMARY ENERGY DEMAND | 429.0 mill. kl | 590 mill. kl | 770 mill. kl |
| RATE OF ENERGY SAVING | - | 15.5% | 25% |
| TYPE OF ENERGY | Quantity | Rate (%) | Rate (%) |
| COAL | 92.4 mill. tons | 16.7 | 19.5 |
| NUCLEAR | 15.7 mill. kW | 5.0 | 11.3 |
| NATURAL GAS | 25.9 mill. kl | 6.0 | 11.5 |
| WATER POWER - ORDINARY HYDRO-POWER | 19.0 mill kW | 5.6 | 5.0 |
| - PUMPING-UP HYDRO-POWER | 10.8 mill. kW | 2.2 | 5.0 |
| GEOTHERMAL POWER | 0.3 mill. kl | 0.1 | 1.0 |
| NEW ENERGY | 0.7 mill. kl | 0.2 | 2.5 |
| OIL | 285.0 mill. kl | 66.4 | 49.2 |
| TOTAL SUPPLY | 429.0 mill. kl | 100.0 | 100.0 |

TABLE II

OUTLOOK OF INSTALLED ELECTRIC POWER IN JAPAN (MW)

| I TEM | FISCAL YEAR 1980 | FISCAL YEAR 1990 | FISCAL YEAR 2000 |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| NUCLEAR | 15,510 | 46,000 | 90,000 |
| COAL | 5,260 | 23,000 | 50,000 |
| LNG | 19,710 | 43,000 | 47,000 |
| ORDINARY HYDRO POWER | 17,860 | 22,000 | 28,000 |
| PUMPING-UP HYDRO POWER | 10,810 | 22,000 | 33,000 |
| GEOTHERMAL POWER | 130 | 2,700 | 7,000 |
| LPG | 600 | 3,300 | 45,000 |
| OIL | 59,480 | 4,700 | 22.5 |
| TOTAL | 129,360 | 166,700 | 300,000 |

cy - uranium enrichment, reprocessing and the Advanced Thermal Reactor have come to maturity to the stage of being transferred to private industry. Electric power generation and distribution in Japan are being undertaken by private enterprises, so that the technology developed in government institutions requires at a certain stage to be transferred to relevant nongovernmental establishments for commercial application. Smooth implementation of this transfer will depend on opportune and appropriate assistance by the Government in the transition period to permit private enterprises to take increasingly active parts in the efforts to realize practical and economically viable application.

The next fourth point in our Programme is the promotion of research and development in fields other than those covered by the preceding three points. They include studies related to the treatment and disposal of high-level waste discharged from fuel reprocessing plants, the reprocessing of spent fuel from fast breeder reactors, and other problems remaining to be solved in furthering nuclear power generation and in establishing the nuclear fuel cycle.

In the domain of nuclear fusion, our Programme provides with the achievement of self-ignition before the end of the present century, following the realization of energy breakeven plasma condition with our JT-60 Tokamak device - now under construction -.

The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor - intended for multiple uses - is taken up for its promise of extending nuclear applications to new fields. Our immediate objective is the construction of an experimental reactor of about 50 MWt, planned to enter into service around 1990, which will embody the results of research and development gained in the past. The envisaged reactor outlet temperature - originally set at 1,000° centigrade - has been modified to the more realistic value of 950° centigrade.

In the field of nuclear ship propulsion, we will proceed on our plans for experimental voyages to be undertaken by our first nuclear ship Mutsu. We will in parallel pursue the development of an advanced marine reactor of more compact and efficient design.

In the field of radiological applications, our studies will be directed in particular to the practical utilization of accelerators in medical diagnosis and treatment.

Point 5 in our Programme is the nuclear non-proliferation. Our unvarying policy - expressly stated in our Basic Law governing atomic energy - is to limit our application of nuclear energy strictly to peaceful uses, and to contribute our unreserved support to the maintenance and reinforcement of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In line with this policy, we took it upon ourselves to accept the Iaea Safeguards Measures. All these actions on our part have manifested to the world our guarantee of our peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. We will continue to undertake appropriate improvements of the national safeguards so as to satisfy the effective and efficient application of the Iaea safeguards under the Npt regime.

Taking due note of the conclusions reached by the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, we intend to participate more positively in the question of non-proliferation. To this end, we will continue to cooperate with the Agency in improving the international safeguards through our support programmes to the Agency.

We also intend to contribute actively toward the effective and rational realization of the new framework for international cooperation now under study in the Agency, such as the systems for international plutonium storage and for assuring the supply of nuclear materials and technology, with due account taken of their relation to the international nonproliferation regime.

Point 6 is the international collaboration: the peaceful uses of atomic energy - whether for power genera-

Table III RD&D Schedule of Main Projects
(Example: Construction Operation)

| ITEM | YEAR | 1980 | 85 | 90 | 95 | 2000 | REMARKS |
|---|------|-------------------------------------|---|---|----|------|--|
| 1. Uranium Enrichment | | Pilot Plant | Demonstration Plant 0.2 mill SWU/y | Commercial Plant | | | commercial plant capacity, 1 mill SWU/y at 1995, 3 mill SWU/y at 2000 |
| 2. Reprocessing | | Tokai Plant 200 t/y | | 2nd Plant 1200 t/y | | | third plant: under consideration |
| 3. Treatment & disposal of high level waste | | | Vitrification & Storage Pilot Plant | | | | geological formation demonstration at early stage of 21 C |
| 4. Advanced Thermal Reactor | | Prototype Reactor FUGEN 165 MWe | | Demonstration Reactor 600 MWe | | | deuterium moderated boiling light water type |
| 5. Pu use in LWR | | | Demonstration Tests of Several Assemblies | Demonstration Tests of 1/3 Core PWR BWR | | | |
| 6. Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor | | Experimental Reactor JOYO 100 MW th | Prototype Reactor MONJU 280 MWe | Demonstration Reactor 1000 MWe class | | | commercial operation after about 2010 |
| 7. High Temperature Reactor | | | Experimental Reactor 50 MW th | | | | core outlet temperature 950°C |
| 8. Fusion | | TOKAMAK Type "JT-60" | | Fusion Experimental Reactor | | | JT - 60 to achieve energy breakeven conditions-FER to achieve self-ignition conditions |

tion or for radiological applications—should benefit all mankind, and in line with this principle, we intend to contribute actively toward international progress of peaceful nuclear applications.

International collaboration is, besides, increasing its importance for projects such as on nuclear fusion and on fast breeder development, which have come to acquire a scale that calls for efforts and expenditures far exceeding what can be supported by one nation alone. International co-operation in research is also indispensable for studies on subjects of common international interest, such as related to the safety aspects of nuclear utilization: we plan to actively promote international collaboration

in such research and development efforts, without, however, impairing the integrity of our nationally implemented projects.

As an example of what we are already accomplishing, we have launched in full working scale our programme based on the IAEA Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology, by which we are cooperating with the Agency member countries in South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific on the matter of practical utilization of ionizing radiations and radioisotopes. In this programme, we will continue to respond actively to requests from various countries for technical cooperation in such fields

as food preservation, medical treatment and manufacturing industries.

The prominent rises seen of recent years in the price of oil have posed problems of energy supply all over the world. The number of countries is increasing which are considering the introduction of nuclear power in order to ensure a continued supply of energy. Those countries have to begin with training of qualified specialists, construction and operation of research reactors and acquisition of knowledge and experience of ensuring safety of nuclear facilities.

In the domain of nuclear power generation, our cooperation will be premised upon assurance of nuclear non-proliferation, and in so far as countries identify themselves with the Non-proliferation Treaty, we will be able to cooperate positively on such areas as mentioned above.

CONCLUSION

I have presented in brief the highlights of our newly-established Long-Term Programme for Nuclear Development and Utilization. In view of the fact that nuclear energy has already firmly established itself as one of the economical source of electric power, and has acquired a solid footing in our economic system, we plan to maintain with intensified vigour our efforts in promoting the development of nuclear energy to foster its contribution to the further development of our economy and to further enhancement of our living standards. We will be directing more efforts to collaborating with other fellow-countries in our endeavour to contribute to the advancement of the international community.

CSO: 5100/4213

END